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RESPONDING TO THE AMBIGUITY OF MILLER v. ALABAMA:
THE TIME HAS COME FOR STATES TO LEGISLATE FOR A
JUVENILE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE SENTENCING REGIME
COURTNEY AMELUNG ∗
Between the late 1970s and 1990s, the criminal justice system in
the United States became increasingly punitive, as a movement to
restructure the sentencing process and increase sentence severity took
1
hold. The prior “rehabilitative ideal” fell apart and was replaced by
an ideology that emphasized incapacitation and retribution as
2
primary goals of criminal sentencing. This shift toward a punitive
ideal influenced not only the treatment of adult offenders but also
3
juvenile offenders. States enacted “tough on crime” policies in
response to concerns that the juvenile justice system was unable to
4
effectively address violent youth crime. One such policy permitted
states to lower the minimum age at which an adult court could
5
exercise jurisdiction over a juvenile. Consequently, some juveniles
Copyright © 2013 by Courtney Amelung.
∗
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1. Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United
States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 413–14.
2. Id. at 414. Prior to its demise, the theory of rehabilitation dominated our nation’s
criminal justice system, receiving nearly unanimous support from criminal justice
professionals. Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in the Age of
Prisons, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 497, 498 (1995). Commencing in the 1970s,
however, these professionals, as well as the greater public, increasingly viewed
rehabilitation as an impossible feat that rarely produced desired results (such as
recidivism). Id. at 498–99.
3. Beale, supra note 1, at 415. This shift was partly a result of policymakers’
prediction that “juvenile superpredators” were on the brink of committing massive violent
crime throughout the nation. James Traub, The Criminals of Tomorrow, NEW YORKER, Nov.
4, 1996, at 50. Such crime never occurred, however, and the superpredator theory was
ultimately deemed inaccurate. JODY KENT LAVY, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFO. EXCH., IN THE
WAKE OF MILLER V. ALABAMA, STATES SHOULD RETHINK HOW TO HOLD YOUTHFUL
OFFENDERS ACCOUNTABLE (2012), available at http://jjie.org/wake-of-miller-v-alabamastates-should-rethink-how-hold-youthful-offenders-accountable/91413.
4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 43, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No.
10-9647), 2012 WL 523347.
5. Id. At the end of the 1999 legislative session, twenty-three states and the District of
Columbia had at least one statutory provision that did not specify a minimum age at which
a juvenile could be transferred to an adult court. Sixteen states set the minimum age at
fourteen, with the remaining states falling within the spectrum of ten and fifteen years of
age. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
STATISTICAL
BRIEFING
BOOK,
available
at
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convicted of homicide in adult court became subject to the
mandatory life-without-parole sentences imposed by twenty-eight
6
states and the federal government. In the United States, more than
2,500 individuals are serving life-without-parole sentences for
7
homicides they committed as juveniles. More than 2,000 of those
8
individuals were sentenced under a mandatory sentencing regime.
9
In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison
without parole for juvenile homicide offenders. The Court’s decision
10
11
involved the consolidated cases of Miller v. State and Jackson v. State.
In each case, a fourteen-year-old was convicted of murder and
sentenced to a mandatory term of life without parole pursuant to a
12
state criminal statute specifying such punishment.
In Jackson v. State, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson and two other boys
13
went to a video store to commit a robbery. On the way to the store,
Jackson became aware that one of the boys was carrying a sawed-off
14
shotgun in his coat sleeve. Jackson remained outside of the store for
most of the robbery, but entered before one of his co-conspirators
15
shot and killed the store clerk. Jackson was charged as an adult, and
a jury found him guilty of capital felony murder and aggravated
16
robbery. The judge imposed a statutorily mandated sentence of life
17
imprisonment without parole. After the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction, Jackson filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, arguing that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04105.asp?qaDate=20020425&
text= (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
6. Brett Kendall, Justices Reject Required Life Sentences for Juveniles, WALL ST. J., June 26,
2012, at A6.
7. U.S. Supreme Court Bans Mandatory Life Without Parole for Youth, NAT’L CTR. FOR
YOUTH
LAW,
http://www.youthlaw.org/juvenile_justice/6/us_supreme_court_bans_mandatory_
life_without_parole_for_youth/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
8. Id.
9. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
10. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev’d, Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
11. Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757 (Ark. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455.
12. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–63.
13. Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 758.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 758–59.
16. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
17. Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (West 1997).
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prohibit the mandatory sentencing of life without parole for juveniles
18
The circuit court dismissed
fourteen years of age or younger.
Jackson’s petition, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed on
the grounds that a life-without-parole sentence is not unconstitutional
19
when imposed pursuant to a state statute.
In Miller v. State, petitioner Evan Miller and his friend, after a
night of drinking and drug use, savagely beat Miller’s neighbor and
20
Miller was initially
set his trailer on fire, killing the neighbor.
charged as a juvenile, but the District Attorney sought, and the court
21
granted, removal of the case to adult court. A jury found Miller
22
guilty of murder in the course of arson. The trial court imposed a
23
statutorily mandated minimum punishment of life without parole.
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the
sentence was not disproportionate in comparison to the crime
committed, and that its mandatory nature was permissible under the
24
Eighth Amendment.
Both Miller and Jackson filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court, asserting two constitutional challenges to their
sentences: (1) that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
categorically prohibit sentencing fourteen-year-olds to life without the
possibility of parole, and (2) that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the imposition of life without the possibility of
parole under a mandatory sentencing scheme that does not consider
25
the offender’s age or other mitigating evidence.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the
mandatory imposition of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles
convicted of homicide violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
26
The Court reasoned that a
of cruel and unusual punishment.

18. Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 104–05 (Ark. 2011).
19. Id. at 105.
20. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 683 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev’d, Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
21. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462.
22. Id. at 2463.
23. Id.; ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(c) (West 1982).
24. Miller, 63 So. 3d at 686, 691.
25. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9646),
2012 WL 588454; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 109647), 2012 WL 523347. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). The remainder of this Comment will refer
exclusively to the Eighth Amendment.
26. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455.
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mandatory sentencing scheme disregards a juvenile’s lessened
culpability and greater capacity for change, and thus contravenes the
requirement, established in prior decisions, of individualized
27
sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the sentences and remanded the
28
cases for reconsideration by the state trial courts.
In the wake of Miller, states that endorsed mandatory life-withoutparole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders will implement
29
changes to bring them in compliance with that decision. Miller’s
vague language left many questions unanswered, however, including
whether the holding should be applied retroactively and which
sentences judges may legally impose upon juvenile homicide
30
offenders. Furthermore, Miller does not impose a duty to respond
31
on either the legislative or executive branch of government. While
the Court’s decision does not provide guidance for its
implementation, it does provide a significant impetus to change the
manner in which the legal system holds juvenile criminals
accountable for their crimes. This Comment will argue that states
should respond to Miller by enacting a juvenile sentencing regime that
32
is grounded in the principles and values of restorative justice. Such
a regime should consist of a blended sentencing approach, under
which juvenile offenders would receive restorative sentences as a
33
complement to existing sentencing practices.
I. BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

27. Id. at 2460.
28. Id. at 2475. In early April 2013, the Arkansas Supreme Court held a hearing to
consider a re-sentencing request filed on behalf of Kuntrell Jackson. Hearing Set Over
(Mar.
1,
2013),
Youth’s
Life
Sentence,
COURIER
http://www.couriernews.com/view/full_story/21856510/article-Hearing-set-over-youthslife-sentence. Jackson’s attorneys requested that the supreme court send the case back to
the circuit court for re-sentencing. Id.
29. LAVY, supra note 3.
30. Maggie Clark, States Reconsider Juvenile Life Sentences, STATELINE (July 27, 2012),
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/states-reconsider-juvenile-lifesentences-85899407729 (“The court did not specify whether the rule changes apply to the
more than 2,500 juvenile life sentences already handed down, or what judges should do in
the interim before the legislature can offer a new sentencing structure.”).
31. LAVY, supra note 3.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.D.
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imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 34 To
determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts should
not look “through a historical prism,” rather “courts should observe
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
35
maturing society.” Furthermore, the concept of proportionality is a
36
crucial factor in the court’s determination.
Two strands of precedent reflect the Court’s concern with
proportional punishment. First, the Court has prohibited the
mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that
sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and
37
the details of an offense before issuing a death sentence. Second,
the Court has adopted a categorical ban on certain sentencing
practices based on disparities between the culpability of a class of
38
offenders and the severity of a penalty. For example, the Court has
held unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty for
nonhomicidal crimes and crimes committed by mentally disabled
39
The Court’s decision in Miller represents the
defendants.
40
confluence of these two strands of precedent.
A. The Eighth Amendment Prohibits the Mandatory Imposition of
Capital Punishment
In the first line of cases, the Court has demanded individualized
sentencing when imposing the death penalty. In Woodson v. North
41
Carolina, the Court held unconstitutional a statute mandating a
death sentence for first-degree murder because it precluded
consideration of “mitigating factors,” such as the personality and
criminal record of the defendant, as well as the circumstances under

34. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
35. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
36. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). As prior case law explains, the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “guarantees individuals the right to not
be subject to excessive sanctions.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). That
right derives from the “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned” to the offense. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
37. See infra Part I.A.
38. See infra Part I.B.
39. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (referring to nonhomicidal crimes);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (referring to mental disability).
40. See infra Part I.C.
41. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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which the crime occurred. 42 This conclusion was warranted by the
fact that a death sentence is final and should, therefore, be imposed
43
cautiously.
Subsequent decisions have elaborated on the requirement that
capital defendants have an opportunity to provide the judge or jury
with any relevant mitigating evidence. For example, in Eddings v.
44
the Court held unconstitutional the mandatory
Oklahoma,
imposition of the death sentence for first-degree murder where state
courts refused to consider the particular qualities of youth as
45
The Court noted
mitigating evidence in the sentencing process.
that “youth is more than a chronological fact”; rather, “[i]t is a time
and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
46
influence and to psychological damage.” Thus, in addition to the
chronological age of a minor, the sentencing judge should also
consider factors such as the minor’s maturity level, emotional
47
development, and family history.
48
By contrast, in Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court addressed a
mandatory life-without-parole sentence in a felony drug case and held
that imposing such a sentence without any consideration of mitigating
49
factors in noncapital cases does not violate the Constitution. The
Court reasoned that while mandatory penalties are severe, they are
not unconstitutional, as they have been imposed consistently
50
throughout American history. Furthermore, the Court concluded
that the “individualized capital sentencing doctrine,” applied in
previous death penalty cases such as Woodson and Eddings, did not

42. Id. at 304–05. The Court was concerned that a sentencing process that neglected
such factors would treat “uniquely individual human beings . . . as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass . . . .” Id. at 304.
43. Id. at 305 (“Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”).
44. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
45. Id. at 115–16. In so holding, the Court distinguished between the admissibility
and the weight of the evidence: The sentencing judge “may determine the weight to be
given relevant mitigating evidence,” but he “may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from [his] consideration.” Id. at 114–15.
46. Id. at 115.
47. Id. at 116. In Eddings, the mitigating evidence was the defendant’s unhappy
upbringing and emotional disturbance, including evidence of a turbulent family history
and beatings by a harsh father. Id. at 114–16.
48. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
49. Id. at 961, 994–95.
50. Id. at 994–95.
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apply outside the capital context because of the distinct nature of the
51
death penalty.
B. The Eighth Amendment Categorically Prohibits Particular Penalties as
Applied Against Juveniles Because of Their Diminished Culpability
Courts apply a two-step analysis to determine whether the Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits a particular sentence against a
class of offenders. First, courts determine “whether there is a national
52
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.” This objective
test looks first to federal and state statutes because legislation is the
“clearest and most reliable . . . evidence of contemporary values,” and
53
Consensus, however, is not
then considers sentencing practices.
conclusive, and courts must also use their judgment when
determining whether the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits a
54
particular sentence. Courts are guided by “the standards elaborated
by controlling precedents and by [their] own understanding and
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and
55
purpose.” Three principal guiding factors have emerged: (1) “the
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and
characteristics,” (2) “the severity of the punishment in question,” and
(3) “whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate
56
penological goals.”
Several of the cases in this group have specifically focused on
juvenile offenders because of their diminished culpability. For
57
example, the Court applied the two-step analysis in Graham v. Florida,
a case in which Terrance Jamar Graham, a sixteen-year-old boy, was
58
found guilty of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery.
Graham was sentenced to life imprisonment in Florida, a state that
had abolished its parole system, effectively leaving Graham with
59
executive clemency as his only chance of release. On review, the
Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids
sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole for the
51.
text.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 995 (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra note 43 and accompanying
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010).
Id. at 2023.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2012); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
Id. at 2018, 2020.
Id. at 2020.
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commission of nonhomicide crimes. 60 Applying the two-step test, the
Court first looked to legislation and sentencing practices in
concluding that a national consensus existed against the sentence
61
under consideration.
In the second step of its two-step analysis, the Graham Court
found an independent justification for categorically prohibiting life62
without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
Regarding the offenders’ culpability, the Court found that
nonhomicide juvenile offenders had “twice diminished moral
culpability” due to their age and the nonhomicidal nature of their
63
64
crimes. The Graham Court relied on the Roper v. Simmons holding
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when
65
committing their crimes.
In Roper, the Court established that juveniles are less deserving of
the most severe punishments than adults because juveniles are
different from adults in three crucial respects. First, juveniles have
“‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’”
which “‘often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and
66
decisions.’” Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
67
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”
According to the Court, juveniles experience such vulnerability
60. Id. at 2030. When Graham was decided, there were 123 juvenile nonhomicide
offenders serving life-without-parole sentences in the United States. Id. at 2024. Seventyseven of those individuals were serving sentences imposed in Florida. Id. The other fortysix were imprisoned in ten states: California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
61. Id. at 2026. Looking to legislative enactments in the United States, the Court
determined that six jurisdictions did not allow life-without-parole sentences for any
juvenile offenders; seven jurisdictions permitted life without parole for juvenile offenders
convicted of homicide crimes; and thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal government permitted sentences of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide
offender in some circumstances.
Id. at 2023. Despite the apparent legislative
endorsement of the sentence, the Court also looked to actual sentencing practices and
discovered that, of the thirty-nine jurisdictions having statutory authorization to sentence
juveniles to life without parole for nonhomicidal crimes, only eleven had in fact done so.
Id. at 2024. Thus, the Court determined that the imposition of a life-without-parole
sentence for juveniles was just as infrequent as other sentences deemed unconstitutional.
Id. at 2025.
62. Id. at 2030.
63. Id. at 2027.
64. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
65. Id. at 578.
66. Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)).
67. Id.
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because of their general inability to control their surrounding
68
environment. Third, juveniles’ character and personality traits are
69
“more transitory” and “not as well formed” as those of adults.
Because juveniles possess these unique characteristics, the Court
found that they deserve special consideration during the sentencing
70
process.
Regarding the severity of the punishment, the Graham Court
noted that life without parole is the “‘second most severe penalty
71
Although the Court conceded that a death
permitted by law.’”
sentence is “‘unique in its severity and irrevocability,’” it argued that
life without parole was not unlike death sentences in a number of key
72
ways. For example, a sentence of life without parole is permanent,
much like a death sentence, as it precludes the offender’s release
73
regardless of subsequent character or behavior improvement.
Furthermore, according to the Graham Court, life without parole is a
particularly harsh sentence for juvenile offenders because they
ultimately spend more time in prison than would an adult offender
74
who receives the same punishment.
Finally, relying once more on Roper, the Graham Court reasoned
that no penological goal justified sentencing juvenile nonhomicide
75
offenders to life without the possibility of parole. According to the
Court, the case for retribution was weak because a juvenile
nonhomicide offender is less culpable than an adult offender, and
thus should not receive the second most severe sentence as
76
punishment. Additionally, the Court found that deterrence did not
justify imposition of the sentence because juveniles’ distinct
characteristics make them less likely to be deterred from committing

68. Id.
69. Id. at 570.
70. Id.
71. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
72. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)).
73. See id. (noting that a life-without-parole sentence “‘means denial of hope; it means
that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the
future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in
prison for the rest of his days.’” (quoting Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526 (1989))).
74. See id. at 2028 (arguing that due to this discrepancy, “[a] 16-year-old and a 75-yearold each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”).
75. Id.
76. Id. This conclusion was warranted because “‘[t]he heart of the retribution
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of
the criminal offender.’” Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).

30

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 72:21

crime. 77 Likewise, the Court found that incapacitation could not serve
as a justification because it required the sentencing judge to decide
that the juvenile can never be reformed, a judgment the Court found
78
questionable given the characteristics of juveniles. Finally, the Court
found that rehabilitation could not justify a life-without-parole
sentence for juveniles because such a sentence by its nature implicitly
79
rejects the goal of rehabilitation.
C. The Miller Decision Represents the Confluence of the Two Strands of
Precedent
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court combined its reasoning from
these two strands of precedent to hold “that mandatory life-without80
parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” First,
the Court noted that while Graham’s categorical ban on life without
parole was for nonhomicidal crimes, nothing that Graham said about
81
The characteristics that make
children was “crime-specific.”
juveniles less culpable and less deserving of severe punishment are
82
Thus, the
present regardless of the type of crime committed.
Graham Court’s reasoning that children are constitutionally different
for sentencing purposes applies to every juvenile life-without-parole
83
sentence, not only those imposed for nonhomicidal offenses.
Furthermore, the Court emphasized Graham’s insistence that the
attributes of youth matter when considering whether life without
84
parole is appropriate for a juvenile. According to the Court, the
mandatory penalty schemes in Miller violated the Graham holding

77. Id. Specifically, juveniles’ “‘impetuous and ill-considered actions’” make them
“less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions.” Id.
at 2028–29 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
78. Id. at 2029 (“It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between
the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
79. See id. at 2030 (reasoning that denying the offender the right to re-enter the
community is an irrevocable judgment that is improper in light of a juvenile’s “capacity for
change and diminished culpability”).
80. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
81. Id. at 2465.
82. See id. (stating that juveniles’ “distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and
environmental vulnerabilities . . . are evident in the same way, and to the same degree,
when (as in both cases here) a botched robbery turns into a killing”).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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because they precluded the sentencing judge from considering such
85
attributes before imposing a sentence of life without parole.
Second, the Court noted that Graham equated life-without-parole
sentences to the death penalty, which, in the Court’s opinion, made
relevant the precedent demanding individualized sentencing in
86
The Court found those cases to emphasize that
capital cases.
sentencing judges must consider juveniles’ special attributes as
87
mitigating evidence before imposing the death penalty. Thus, the
Court noted that “in light of Graham’s reasoning,” the capital cases
reveal that mandatory life-without-parole sentences, like mandatory
88
death sentences, are unacceptable for juvenile offenders. The Court
also rejected the states’ argument that Harmelin forecloses a holding
that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the
Eighth Amendment, as that case did not involve children and its
89
holding was not intended to apply to juvenile offenders. Ultimately,
these two strands of precedent led the Court to conclude that a
sentencing scheme that fails to assess the special characteristics of
youth before imposing juvenile life-without-parole sentences “poses
too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” and thus violates the
90
Eighth Amendment.
II. ANALYSIS
States that impose mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juvenile homicide offenders will now need to implement new
sentencing laws that conform to the constitutional requirements set
91
forth in Miller. While some states have already responded to Miller,
92
these responses are inadequate. Instead, the appropriate response
85. Id. at 2466 (reasoning that the “imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on
juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children”).
86. Id. at 2466–67.
87. Id. at 2467 (reasoning that the discussion of youthfulness in Roper and Graham also
appeared in the capital cases).
88. Id. (arguing that a sentencing judge would be “strictly forbidden” from neglecting
the differences between adult and juvenile offenders when imposing the death penalty).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2469. Because that holding adequately resolved the issue in this case, the
Miller Court declined to address the question of whether a categorical ban on juvenile lifewithout-parole sentences is required under the Eighth Amendment. Id. But see Doriane
Lambelet Coleman & James E. Coleman, Jr., Getting Juvenile Life Without Parole “Right” After
Miller v. Alabama, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 62 (Special Issue 2012) (arguing
that the Miller Court should have categorically banned juvenile life-without-parole
sentences).
91. See infra Part II.A.
92. See infra Part II.A.
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for all states, including those not affected by the Miller decision, is to
incorporate a restorative justice sentencing regime into the juvenile
93
A basic overview of the regime is necessary to
justice system.
understand why restorative justice is the right approach. Part II.B is
devoted to describing restorative justice theory, including where and
how it operates. Part II.C then explains why the implementation of
restorative justice sentencing is an appropriate response to Miller
directly and to juvenile cases in general. Finally, Part II.D posits that
to overcome the hurdles of enacting a restorative justice sentencing
regime through legislation, states should adopt blended sentencing
models, under which juvenile offenders would receive both a
restorative and a traditional adult sentence.
A. Current State Responses to the Miller Decision Are Inadequate
Following the Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, a common
issue has arisen in many states across the country: State statutes do not
provide an alternative sentence now that mandatory life without
parole is no longer available for juvenile homicide offenders, leaving
judges with no guidance as to the sentences that are legally
94
acceptable. In some states, this issue will not be resolved until the
95
legislature amends the relevant sentencing statute. Legislators in all
twenty-eight states that had previously endorsed mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders have said
96
Until then,
that they will consider alternative sentencing laws.
however, states have demonstrated a variety of potential responses to
Miller.
In North Carolina, Governor Perdue signed an amendment to
the sentencing laws on first-degree murder that mandates life with
97
parole if the juvenile is convicted under the felony-murder doctrine.
The amendment also outlines the hearing procedure that must be
used to determine whether a juvenile’s sentence should be life with or
98
without parole if the juvenile is not convicted under that doctrine.
Mitigating factors to be considered by the court at such a hearing
include the juvenile defendant’s age, maturity level, mental capacity,
93. See infra Part II.B.
94. Scott Michels, A Reprieve for Juvenile Lifers?, CRIME REPORT (July 26, 2012, 5:51
AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/articles/2012-07-a-reprieve-for-juvenile-lifers.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also Coleman & Coleman, supra note 90, at 68–75 (suggesting three
potential legislative responses to the Miller decision).
97. S. 635, 2011th Sess. (N.C. 2012).
98. Id.
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personal background, prior criminal conduct, and potential for
99
rehabilitation. The amendment also provides that life with parole
means that the defendant is eligible for a five-year term of parole after
100
a minimum of twenty-five years of imprisonment. North Carolina’s
amendment is consistent with Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the
Miller opinion. Justice Breyer maintained that only juveniles who had
killed or intended to kill another individual could be sentenced to life
101
without parole without violating the Constitution. North Carolina’s
response is not comprehensive, however, because it fails to expressly
address the sentence that should apply to juveniles who are not
charged under the felony-murder doctrine.
In Pennsylvania, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Ron
Marsico introduced an amendment in late September 2012 to the
sentencing law for juveniles convicted of first- and second-degree
102
In October, the Pennsylvania General Assembly voted to
murder.
adopt the amendment, which ended the mandatory life-withoutparole sentence for any juvenile convicted of those crimes and
103
Now, when
significantly shortened the applicable sentence.
considering the appropriate punishment for a juvenile convicted of
first-degree murder, a judge or jury can still impose a life-withoutparole sentence, but the decision maker also has the option of
imposing a sentence of thirty-five years to life for a juvenile of at least
age fifteen, or twenty-five years to life for a juvenile under age fifteen,
104
With respect to juveniles
both with the possibility of parole.
convicted of second-degree murder, a judge or jury can no longer
105
Rather, juveniles between ages fifteen
impose life without parole.
and seventeen receive a minimum of thirty years to life, while
juveniles under age fifteen receive a minimum of twenty years to
106
Although the amendment brings the state into compliance
life.

99. Id. This list of factors is not exhaustive. The court is free to consider “[a]ny other
mitigating factor or circumstance” that the defendant or defense counsel may choose to
present. Id.
100. Id.
101. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing
that while transferred intent is typically attributed to all participants in felony-murder
cases, this intent is not sufficient to impose a life-with-parole sentence on a juvenile who
did not actually kill or intend to kill).
102. Moriah Balingit, Other States Watch How Pennsylvania Handles Life Terms for Juveniles,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 2012, at A1.
103. S. 850, Reg. Sess. 2011–2012 (Pa. 2012).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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with Miller, the question remains whether mere compliance is an
adequate response. Some commentators have expressed fear that
judges will continue to impose life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles, even though, under Miller, these sentences are tolerated
107
Others view the proposed
only in certain circumstances.
amendment as a “quick fix” to comply with Miller rather than a careful
reconsideration of how to treat juveniles convicted of serious
108
crimes.
In Iowa, Governor Terry Branstad has arguably implemented the
least constructive response to Miller. While he technically reduced the
life sentences of thirty-eight homicide offenders who committed their
crimes as minors, he ordered each offender to serve a mandatory
109
Governor
sentence of sixty years before being eligible for parole.
Branstad plans to propose a new sentencing law in next year’s
legislative session that would require a sixty-year minimum sentence
110
for juvenile homicide offenders in Iowa.
B. The Appropriate Response to Miller: A Restorative Justice Sentencing
Regime
In the wake of Miller, states with criminal statutes that impose
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide
offenders will need to enact sentencing laws that comply with the

107. Balingit, supra note 102. This fear is well-founded given the Miller Court’s
statement that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to [life without parole] will
be uncommon.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
108. Id. Marsha Levick of the Juvenile Law Center “th[ought] the Legislature should
take some time to consider what the alternatives are.” Id.
109. James Q. Lynch, Trish Mehaffey & Mike Wiser, Branstad Commutes Life Sentences for
(July
16,
2012),
38
Iowa
Juvenile
Murderers,
GAZETTE
http://thegazette.com/2012/07/16/branstad
-commutes-life-sentences-for-38-iowa-juvenile-murderers/. The Iowa Supreme Court heard
arguments in a case challenging Branstad’s order in early April 2013. David Pitt, Iowa
Supreme
Court
Hears
Juvenile
Parole
Case,
SFGATE
(Apr.
9,
2013),
http://www.sfgate.com/news/crime/
article/Iowa-Supreme-Court-hears-juvenile-parole-case-4420746.php.
Defense counsel,
whose client would not be eligible for parole until age seventy-seven, argued that the
governor’s order was violative of the “spirit or intent” of the Miller decision. Id. The
Assistant Attorney General who represented the state argued that the Miller decision
requires only the possibility, not the guarantee, of release on parole. Id.
110. Clark, supra note 30. Commentators argue that sixty-year sentences are essentially
“life” sentences for offenders who commit their offenses at the age of thirteen or fourteen.
Tamar Rebecca Birckhead, States Respond to Supreme Court JLWOP Decision, JUVENILE JUSTICE
BLOG (July 19, 2012), http://juvenilejusticeblog.web.unc.edu/2012/07/17/statesrespond-to-supreme-court-jlwop-decision/. Thus, it is possible that long term-of-years
sentences will be the next issue the Supreme Court addresses within this line of cases.
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constitutional demands of that decision. 111 The appropriate response
for these—and all—states is to incorporate restorative justice
112
According to an
sentences into the juvenile sentencing structure.
international advocacy group, “[r]estorative justice is a[n]
[alternative] theory of justice that emphasizes repairing the harm
caused or revealed by criminal behaviour. It is best accomplished
113
The
through cooperative processes that include all stakeholders.”
remainder of this Section elaborates on the theory of restorative
justice by discussing its development in the United States and
114
abroad and describes the four most pervasive restorative justice
115
programs in the United States.
1. What Is Restorative Justice?
Restorative justice is a social reform movement that, since the
1970s, has steadily gained popularity across the globe. 116 It is
grounded in a theory of justice that emphasizes the repair of harm
caused by criminal behavior, a process that involves the cooperation
and involvement of offenders, victims, and their respective
117
Although disagreement exists as to the precise
communities.
118
definition of restorative justice, Howard Zehr, the leading visionary
111. Michels, supra note 94.
112. The Miller decision had no impact on eight states and the District of Columbia,
which already prohibited mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. Liliana
Segura & Matt Stroud, The Uncertain Fate of Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Lifers, NATION (Aug. 7,
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/169268/uncertain-fate-pennsylvanias-juvenilelifers#. Sixteen states, including Maryland, which have sentencing laws that give decisionmakers discretion to impose life without parole for juveniles (as opposed to
unconstitutional mandatory sentencing laws), can decide whether they want to amend
their laws in light of Miller. Id. For the reasons outlined below, even these states should
consider enacting a new sentencing regime that incorporates restorative justice sentences.
113. Introduction
to
Restorative
Justice,
RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE
ONLINE,
http://www.restorativejustice.org/university-classroom/01introduction (last visited Feb.
14, 2013).
114. See infra Part II.B.1.
115. See infra Part II.B.2.
116. Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social
Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 254 (2005).
117. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ONLINE, http://www.restorativejustice.org/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2013).
118. John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1728–29 (1999) (“Restorative justice is a process of bringing together
the stakeholders (victims, offenders, communities) in a search of justice that heals the hurt
of crime, instead of responding to hurt with more hurt.”); Lode Walgrave, Restoration in
Youth Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 543, 552 (2004) (“[B]y restorative justice I mean an option
on doing justice after the occurrence of a crime which gives priority to repairing the harm
that has been caused by that crime.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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and architect of the restorative justice movement, has provided the
most succinct definition: “Restorative justice is a process to involve, to
the extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense and to
collectively identify and address harms, needs, and obligations, in
119
The movement
order to heal and put things as right as possible.”
has been influenced by the concern for greater rights for crime
victims, community involvement in the justice system, and decreasing
120
recidivism and incarceration rates.
Canada, which began using restorative programs in 1974, is
121
considered the “birthplace” of the restorative justice movement.
Today, however, the movement has resulted in thousands of programs
122
across many countries, and it has become particularly significant in
123
Restorative justice
discussions regarding juvenile justice reform.
theory currently influences the juvenile justice systems in New
Zealand, Australia, Hong Kong, Israel, South Africa, and a large part
124
of Western Europe.
In the United States, restorative justice has only recently gained
125
popularity. Restorative justice programs first arose in the late 1970s;
significant development of these programs, however, did not occur
126
until the 1990s. Despite the increasing interest in restorative justice,
it continues to operate primarily on the periphery of the United
States criminal justice system in small programs run by private
127
Most programs are only available to
agencies and churches.

119. Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 256.
120. DONALD J. SCHMID, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN NEW ZEALAND: A MODEL FOR U.S.
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
9
(2001),
available
at
http://www.fulbright.org.nz/wpcontent/uploads/2011/
12/axford2001_schmid.pdf.
121. Hon. T. Bennett Burkemper, Jr. et al., Restorative Justice in Missouri’s Juvenile System,
63 J. MO. B. 128, 130 (2007).
122. Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 254.
123. Walgrave, supra note 118, at 543–44.
124. Burkemper, supra note 121, at 130. New Zealand was the first country to enact
legislation to incorporate restorative justice principles into its juvenile justice system. Id.
In 1989, the country passed a law that requires the participation of juvenile offenders in
family group conferencing, either “as a diversionary measure, or as a prerequisite for the
judge to sentence the child in youth court.” Id. Unfortunately, the sample size is small;
other than New Zealand, only a few isolated experiments exist. Walgrave, supra note 118,
at 577.
125. Christopher D. Lee, Comment, They All Laughed at Christopher Columbus When He
Said the World Was Round: The Not-So-Radical and Reasonable Need for a Restorative Justice Model
Statute, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 523, 529 (2011).
126. Burkemper, supra note 121, at 130.
127. Beale, supra note 1, at 413.
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juveniles convicted of minor, nonviolent, and nonsexual crimes.128
Moreover, these programs have been unable to substantially influence
the juvenile justice system because they lack legislative attention and
129
financial resources. Many state statutes do not reference restorative
130
Others have inserted restorative ideas into the
justice at all.
purpose clauses of their juvenile justice legislation, but provide no
specific framework or parameters for the implementation of those
131
A few state statutes, however, provide explicit guidelines for
ideas.
132
the establishment of juvenile restorative justice programs.
2. How Does Restorative Justice Operate?
Restorative justice programs typically fall into one of two
categories: They provide either restorative processes or restorative
133
A restorative process is one in which the offender and
outcomes.
the victim, and sometimes community members, work together to

128. Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST.:
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 235, 240 (2000). The use of restorative justice in the United States
is not nearly as prevalent or as established as it is in other countries around the world. For
example, in New Zealand, family group conferencing is used for all juvenile crimes except
murder and homicide. Id. In Germany, approximately seventy percent of adult and
juvenile cases that used victim-offender mediation in 1995 involved violent crimes. Id. In
Austria in 1996, seventy-three percent of adult cases and forty-three percent of juvenile
cases that took advantage of some form of restorative justice involved violent crimes. Id.
129. Amanda L. Paye, Comment, Communities Take Control of Crime: Incorporating the
Conferencing Model into the United States Juvenile Justice System, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 161,
163 (1999).
130. Sylvia Clute, Creating Statutes to Deliver Restorative Justice, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
ONLINE (July 18, 2011), http://www.restorativejustice.org/RJOB/creating-statutes-todeliver-restorative-justice.
131. Walgrave, supra note 118, at 568. Maryland, for example, utilizes restorative justice
language in the purpose clause of its state code. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A02 (West 2001). According to the statute, the juvenile justice system must balance three
objectives: “(i) [p]ublic safety and the protection of the community; (ii) [a]ccountability
of the child to the victim and the community for the offenses committed; and (iii)
[c]ompetency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible and
productive members of society.” Id.
132. Clute, supra note 130. In Colorado, for example, the Children’s Code establishes
a council to provide assistance and education related to restorative justice programs. COL.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-213 (West 2007). This council, known as the Restorative Justice
Coordinating Council, “support[s] the development of restorative justice programs,
serve[s] as a central repository for information, assist[s] in the development and provision
of related education and training, and provide[s] technical assistance to entities engaged
in or wishing to develop restorative justice programs.” Id.
133. Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U. L.
REV. 53, 54 (1998).
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resolve the impact of a particular crime. 134 Restorative processes
emphasize dialogue among the parties affected by the crime and
include mechanisms for communication, such as victim-offender
mediation, family group conferences, sentencing circles, and
135
community reparative boards, among others. Restorative outcomes,
in comparison, constitute the agreements reached after participation
136
These agreements might include
in a restorative process.
undertakings such as victim support groups, offender rehabilitation,
137
and community service activities. An ideal restorative justice system
138
would include both restorative processes and restorative outcomes.
Victim-offender mediation allows victims to reveal how the crime
has affected them physically, emotionally, and financially, and to
139
confront their offender by asking him any questions. Likewise, the
offender has the opportunity to explain how the crime occurred, take
140
ownership for his actions, and make amends with the victim.
Victim-offender mediation is usually conducted in a structured setting
141
To qualify for
with a trained mediator who leads the discussion.
victim-offender mediation, the offender must confess and agree to
142
participate in the process.
134. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE
PROGRAMMES
7
(2006),
available
at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/06-56290_Ebook.pdf.
135. Nancy Rodriguez, Restorative Justice at Work: Examining the Impact of Restorative Justice
Resolutions on Juvenile Recidivism, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 355, 357 (2007). In the United
States, the most popular restorative justice process is victim-offender mediation.
Approximately 300 victim-offender mediation programs exist throughout the country, and
roughly half of these programs deal exclusively with juveniles. Beale, supra note 1, at 421.
Family conferencing, sentencing circles, and community reparative boards are also
frequently utilized in juvenile justice systems. Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 357–58.
136. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 134.
137. Van Ness & Nolan, supra note 133, at 54.
138. Id.
139. Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or Foe? A Systemic Look at
the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE. L. REV. 667, 674 (2005).
140. Id.
141. Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative Conferencing
Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 2. Most victim-offender mediations result in a
restitution agreement. Kurki, supra note 128, at 270. However, the participants do not
always reach an agreement, as it is “often seen as secondary to emotional healing and
growth.” Id. Victims and offenders alike have reported that the opportunity to express
their thoughts and feelings is more meaningful than the restitution agreement. Id.
142. Ilyssa Wellikoff, Note, Victim-Offender Mediation and Violent Crimes: On the Way to
Justice, 5 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2 (2004). Some cases are referred to
victim-offender mediation as an alternative to formal prosecution and punishment. Other
cases are referred as part of the offender’s probation or other punishment after formal
adjudication by the court. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 2.
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Family group conferencing is similar to victim-offender
mediation in that the offender can describe what happened, take
responsibility for his actions, and understand how those actions have
143
It differs
impacted both the victim and the community at large.
from victim-offender mediation, however, because it involves a
broader group of people—family, friends, community members, and
representatives of the criminal justice system may participate in the
144
Thus, rather than solely focusing on restoring the
conference.
victim and offender, family group conferences also seek to restore the
145
offender’s ties with his community and family. Together, this group
146
of individuals decides how best to hold the offender accountable.
Like family group conferencing, circle sentencing takes a more
“holistic” approach to restorative justice through its inclusion of all
those who may be affected by a crime, including the offender, the
147
These circles
victim, community members, friends, and family.
148
often also include judges, attorneys, and local law enforcement.
These individuals gather in a circle and take turns speaking as they
149
The point of these circles is not only
pass a “talking piece.”
reparation for the harm caused, but also rehabilitation and re150
As is
integration of the victim and offender into the community.
the case with family group conferencing, members of the circle
determine how the offender should be held accountable for his
151
crime.
143. Walgrave, supra note 118, at 572. A trained facilitator guides the discussion during
the conference. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 5. The offender begins the
discussion by describing how the crime took place. Id. The remaining participants
respond by describing the impact the crime has had on their respective lives. Id.
144. Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 357. Both the offender and the victim can
recommend who should be invited to participate in the conference. Bazemore &
Umbreit, supra note 141, at 5.
145. Lee, supra note 125, at 546.
146. Burkemper, supra note 121, at 129. After the discussion, the victim typically
suggests sanctions for the offender, receiving input from the other participants. Bazemore
& Umbreit, supra note 141, at 5. The conference ends when all participants sign an
agreement outlining the agreed upon sanctions. Id.
147. Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 357. In some cases, the judge refers a case to circle
sentencing, and then uses the resultant agreement as a recommendation during the
sentencing process. Kurki, supra note 128, at 281. In other cases, the judge, prosecutor,
and defense attorney participate in the sentencing circle, and the agreement reached at
the circle becomes the offender’s final sentence. Id.
148. Lee, supra note 125, at 550.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 548.
151. Reimund, supra note 139, at 677. All circle members participate in the
development of a sentencing plan for the offender. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141,
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Reparative boards bring the offender, and sometimes the victim,
before a panel of community members who together discuss the
152
The
offender’s crime and the resultant harm to the community.
panel decides how to address the harm caused by the crime, which
typically results in a written agreement stipulating that the offender
will make reparations, often through restitution or community
153
service.
C. Why Should States Adopt Restorative Justice?
States should incorporate concepts of restorative justice into
their juvenile justice systems for two primary reasons. First, doing so
would appropriately address the Supreme Court’s concerns in Miller,
which include the need to treat juveniles differently from adults for
sentencing purposes, as well as the need for individualized sentencing
154
Second,
when imposing life-without-parole sentences on juveniles.
notwithstanding the requirements of Miller, incorporating restorative
sentences is appropriate because such sentences would supplant the
current punitive approach to the justice system by emphasizing the
goals of rehabilitation, restoration, and re-integration.
1. A Restorative Sentencing Regime Would Respond to the Supreme
Court’s Concerns in Miller
Justice systems are evaluated based on their ability to fulfill
155
The success of the American criminal
certain goals or objectives.
justice system, for example, has typically been measured by its ability
to accomplish the goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
156
In Miller, however, the Court emphasized that
and rehabilitation.
the distinctive attributes of youth diminish these traditional
penological justifications for imposing harsh sentences on juveniles,

at 6. Sometimes the plan requires the justice system, community, or family members to
take certain actions. Id. The process may include secondary circles that monitor
compliance with that plan. Id.
152. Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 357. These community members must receive
extensive training prior to participating on the board. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note
141, at 3.
153. Burkemper, supra note 121, at 129. The board subsequently monitors the
offender to ensure compliance with the agreement, and submits a report of its findings to
the court. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 4.
154. See supra Part I.C.
155. Paye, supra note 129, at 177–78 (“A successful model of justice is dependent upon
measuring it against its identified objectives.”).
156. Id.
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even when they commit terrible crimes. 157 Consequently, the Court
found that none of these goals could justify imposing a mandatory
158
life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender.
Although the Court did not completely foreclose the possibility of
sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to life without parole, it made
clear that such a harsh penalty should be uncommon in light of
children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
159
change.
If traditional penological goals no longer justify imposition of the
harshest sentences on juveniles, and if opportunities for imposing
these sentences after Miller will be limited, it seems appropriate to
pursue new goals in holding juveniles accountable for their crimes.
Restorative justice sentences, which emphasize restoration and reintegration of the offender, provide such alternative goals. By
emphasizing restoration and re-integration, restorative justice
recognizes that juveniles have diminished culpability and increased
capacity for change, and thus accommodates juveniles better than the
traditional criminal justice system. Restorative sentences, as opposed
to traditional sentences, have a greater positive effect on juvenile
offenders for three principal reasons. First, restorative sentences help
remediate the harm that the offender caused to himself—such as
social exclusion and stigmatization—if he assumes responsibility for
160
the offense and expresses a willingness to accept punishment.
Second, restorative sentences have an educational potential that is not
161
For example, offenders
available with traditional punishment.
often engage in learning experiences, identity building, and social
162
Finally,
integration when restorative sentences are imposed.
restorative sentences assist the offender, as well as the offender’s
family, in discovering and acknowledging personal problems that may
163
The benefits of
have contributed to the offender’s behavior.
restorative sentences, and their ability to accommodate juveniles’
157. See supra Part I.C.
158. See supra Part I.C.
159. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
160. Walgrave, supra note 118, at 572 (reasoning that if the offender “‘makes good’ his
personal life experience,” re-acceptance and re-integration are more likely to result than
social exclusion and stigmatization).
161. Id. at 572–73 (explaining that restorative sentences can take into account the
special needs of each particular offender).
162. Id. at 573.
163. Id. (“The conversation in the conference, for example, may make clear that drug
use is a serious problem or that family conflicts have been dysfunctional to the education
of children, and it may lead families to accept or seek voluntary welfare assistance.”).
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special attributes, support the contention that restoration and reintegration should become the new goals of the juvenile justice
system.
Traditionally, sentencing uniformity has been a hallmark of the
164
criminal justice system. Uniformity, in its basic sense, demands that
offenders of similar crimes receive similar punishment, while
165
offenders of different crimes receive different punishment.
Skeptics of restorative justice worry that a restorative regime would
166
sacrifice this traditional ideal of sentencing uniformity. Yet the lack
of sentencing uniformity associated with restorative justice is precisely
why a restorative sentencing regime is an appropriate response to
Miller. The Court’s decision in Miller rested primarily on the notion
that the mandatory imposition of life-without-parole sentences
precludes a sentencing judge from taking into account a juvenile
offender’s age, as well as the characteristics and specific circumstances
167
The Court expressed a concern with the
that accompany youth.
traditional need for sentencing uniformity, noting that under the
mandatory sentencing schemes at issue, every juvenile homicide
offender receives the same sentence—“the 17-year-old and the 14year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable
168
household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one.”
Restorative justice addresses this concern because it facilitates
169
individualized solutions. Communities and victims differ greatly in
their temperaments, which can lead to varying agreements and
170
Although sentencing under a restorative justice regime
sentences.
would not obtain uniform results, uniformity must be sacrificed in
favor of consideration of the variable and rapidly changing
characteristics of juveniles. While uniformity must give way to
individualized solutions, accountability need not: restorative justice

164. Beale, supra note 1, at 433.
165. Id. (“Uniformity requires that offenders with similar records, or who have
committed similar offenses, receive similar punishments.”).
166. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 759 (2000) (criticizing victimoffender mediation for producing inconsistent punishments); Beale, supra note 1, at 433
(arguing that restorative justice is at odds with uniformity). But see Michael M. O’Hear, Is
Restorative Justice Compatible with Sentencing Uniformity?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 305, 308 (2005)
(arguing that the concern for uniformity is not a compelling reason to reject restorative
justice).
167. See supra Part I.C.
168. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467–68 (2012).
169. See Beale, supra note 1, at 433 (“By emphasizing individualized solutions,
sentencing under a restorative justice scheme would not have uniform results.”).
170. Lee, supra note 125, at 567.
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sentences would require the offender to assume responsibility for his
actions and make amends for the resultant harm to the victim and the
larger community.
2. A Restorative Sentencing Regime Would Re-Orient the Juvenile
Justice System
A restorative justice sentencing regime is also an appropriate
response generally because restorative justice provides a way of
thinking about crime, and particularly how to hold juvenile offenders
accountable for their crimes, that is distinct from the current punitive
171
approach. In our juvenile justice system, as in the justice system as a
whole, the justification for holding offenders accountable is
172
By violating the
significantly linked to the concept of retribution.
law, offenders become liable to society and cannot be held
173
In a
accountable until they have been appropriately punished.
retributive system, “the state” is the victim of the crime and,
consequently, is responsible for determining how to hold offenders
174
The actual crime victim is the
accountable for their crimes.
secondary victim, and generally maintains no legal standing in the
175
Accordingly, “[t]he resulting
proceedings against the offender.
176
criminal justice system is almost entirely offender driven.”
Restorative justice, by comparison, “provides a uniquely different
orientation to the administration of justice,” by including offenders,
177
victims, and community members in a collective response to crime.
A restorative form of accountability empowers offenders to assume
direct responsibility in making amends to the victims they have
178
Offenders actively repair the
harmed, not to an abstract “state.”

171. SCHMID, supra note 120, at 6.
172. Mark S. Umbreit, Holding Juvenile Offenders Accountable: A Restorative Justice
Perspective, 46 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 31, 31 (1995).
173. Id.
174. See Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 254 (explaining that the criminal justice
system focuses on state interests, which include accountability and punishment).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 355. According to the legal philosopher Conrad
Brunk, the differences between a retributive and restorative system should not be
overstated. Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 257. Brunk argues that retribution and
restoration are not entirely antagonistic; rather, both seek to hold an offender accountable
for his crime through a punishment that is roughly proportional to that crime. Id. Where
they differ significantly is in how to “even the score.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
178. Umbreit, supra note 172, at 31.

44

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 72:21

harm they have caused, rather than passively accept punishment. 179 In
a restorative system, “crime is defined by the harm it causes and not
180
by its transgression of a legal order.” The victim also plays a primary
181
Restorative justice focuses on
role in resolving the conflict.
providing assistance to victims, with the ultimate goal of successfully
182
re-integrating the victims and the offenders into the community.
States should not implement a restorative justice sentencing
regime for juveniles simply because it is distinguishable from our
current juvenile justice system. Rather, states should implement such
a regime because it would accomplish the original, and seemingly
abandoned, rehabilitative goals that governed the juvenile justice
system prior to the adoption of a punitive ideology in the late 1980s
183
Additionally, a restorative sentencing regime would
and 1990s.
broaden the rehabilitative ideology to include restoration and reintegration, and hold juveniles more accountable for their actions.
Therefore, a restorative sentencing regime would simultaneously
emphasize rehabilitative goals and respond effectively to youth crime,
a concern that motivated the shift towards a punitive juvenile justice
184
system.
Restorative justice is guided by three distinct principles, which
make it a rehabilitative, restorative, and re-integrative process not only
for the offender, but also for the victim and the community at large.
First, restorative justice aims to hold offenders accountable by helping
them to comprehend and compensate society for the consequences of
185
their actions. Restorative justice amends harm caused to the victim,
186
By involving
the offender, and their respective communities.
offenders in the process of resolving the crime, they are enabled to

179. Id.
180. Reimund, supra note 139, at 671 (internal quotations marks omitted).
181. Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 255.
182. Van Ness & Nolan, supra note 133, at 53.
183. Beale, supra note 1, at 413.
184. See Gail B. Goodman, Comment, Arrested Development: An Alternative to Juveniles
Serving Life Without Parole in Colorado, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1059, 1093 (2007) (arguing that
the inclusion of restorative sentences “advances the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
court system while addressing society’s concern that the juvenile justice system is too
lenient on young, violent offenders”).
185. Paye, supra note 129, at 165.
186. Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 356.
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accept responsibility for their actions. 187 Once they accept full
188
responsibility, they can be re-integrated into the community.
Second, restorative justice involves victims by giving them a voice
189
In the traditional criminal justice
in the adjudication process.
system, “[i]ndividual crime victims are left on the sidelines of justice,
190
Restorative justice, by comparison,
with little or no input.”
encourages victims to become actively involved in resolving the
191
crime. In most cases, victims meet with their offenders face to face
and engage in dialogue that addresses the impact of the crime and
192
When victims have the
how to repair the resultant harm.
opportunity to work through the effects of the crime, they are
generally better able to forgive their offenders, allowing the re193
integration process to begin.
The final goal of restorative justice is to make communities safer
by attacking, and hopefully preventing, the commission of violent
194
Crime harms not only the individual victim, but also the
crime.
larger community. Harm caused to the community must therefore be
195
To do so, restorative practices involve the
redressed as well.
196
Community members
community in the adjudication process.
provide assistance in the resolution process by suggesting ways in

187. Paye, supra note 129, at 165.
188. Id. at 165–66. In comparison to incarceration, restorative justice programs have
produced lower rates of recidivism, and thus more successful re-integration. A U.S. study
compared one-year re-offense rates among 1,300 juveniles, and determined that those
juveniles who had participated in victim-offender mediation were approximately one-third
less likely to commit another offense than those juveniles who had not. Burkemper, supra
note 121, at 129. Less than one in five (eighteen percent) of the juveniles who
participated in victim-offender mediation committed a crime within a year, as compared to
more than one in four (twenty-seven percent) of those juveniles who did not participate.
Id. Furthermore, the juveniles who participated in victim-offender mediation and reoffended within the year were involved in less serious crimes than those who did not
participate. Id.
189. Paye, supra note 129, at 166.
190. Wellikoff, supra note 142.
191. Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 255.
192. Id. at 269.
193. Paye, supra note 129, at 166.
194. Id.
195. Lee, supra note 125, at 532.
196. Paye, supra note 129, at 166. Proponents of the restorative justice framework have
not reached a consensus on what constitutes a “community.” Rodriguez, supra note 135, at
358. While some researchers endorse a narrow conception of community that includes
only family and friends, others view a community more broadly and include family,
friends, juvenile justice professionals, and community volunteers. Id.
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which the offender can compensate the victim and subsequently re197
enter society.
D. How Can States Implement a Restorative Justice Sentencing Regime?
In response to Miller, all states should enact laws that incorporate
restorative sentences into their juvenile justice systems.
Such
legislation should not merely include restorative language in its
purpose clause or authorize the imposition of restorative sentences.
Rather, this legislation should mandate the development of
restorative sentences and provide the specific framework and
parameters for their implementation. Since an immediate overhaul
of the existing juvenile justice system is not feasible, states can take an
initial step by enacting legislation that uses restorative sentencing as a
complement to existing sentencing practices, especially for offenders
198
This complementary system should be achieved
of violent crimes.
through the enactment of state sentencing laws that provide for
“blended sentences.”
There are five blended sentencing models that judges can utilize
199
when sentencing juveniles. Three of the five approaches permit the
juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over a juvenile’s case: The
“juvenile-exclusive” model allows the judge to impose either a juvenile
sentence or an adult sentence; the “juvenile-inclusive” model allows
the judge to impose both a juvenile and an adult sentence; and the
“juvenile-contiguous” model allows the judge to impose a sentence
that begins in the juvenile system and transfers to the adult system
200
Adult courts have
once the juvenile reaches the age of majority.
jurisdiction over a juvenile’s case under the final two approaches: The
“criminal-exclusive” model allows the judge to choose between
imposing a juvenile or an adult sentence and the “criminal-inclusive”
197. Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 358.
198. See Wellikoff, supra note 142 (arguing that while victim-offender mediation
involving less serious crimes could be used appropriately as an alternative to the
prosecutorial system, mediations involving more violent crimes should be held in
conjunction with the prosecutorial system).
199. See Goodman, supra note 184, at 1091.
200. FRED CHEESMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A DECADE OF NCSC RESEARCH
ON BLENDED SENTENCING OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT
“WHO
GETS
A
SECOND
CHANCE?”
(2011),
http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2011/home/SpecialPrograms/4-4-Blended-Sentencing-of-Juvenile-Offenders.aspx.
Under the “juvenileinclusive” model, the second (adult) sentence is normally suspended or stayed, and is
imposed only if the offender commits some pre-determined violation. Id. Twenty-four
states within the United States currently employ some form of blended sentencing. Id.
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model allows the imposition of both a juvenile and an adult
201
sentence.
The most appropriate way to blend restorative sentences with
existing sentencing practices is through the “juvenile-inclusive”
model. Under this sentencing scheme, juvenile offenders would
202
receive both a restorative sentence and a suspended adult sentence.
The offender would begin his restorative sentence in a juvenile
facility, where he would have access to educational and rehabilitative
203
Once the offender reaches the age of majority, the court
services.
would determine whether he should be re-integrated into society or
transferred to the adult system where he would serve the rest of his
204
sentence. Such a system would hold juvenile offenders accountable
for their crimes, while also giving them another chance at life outside
205
A second, but less effective, way that restorative sentences
of jail.
could be blended with existing sentencing practices is through the
“criminal-inclusive” model, which was recently employed in a first206
Under traditional Florida law, the
degree murder case in Florida.
offender would have been sentenced to a mandatory life sentence, or
207
possibly the death penalty. Instead, after participation in a lengthy
and painstaking victim-offender mediation conference, the
prosecutor offered the offender the choice between a twenty-year
prison sentence plus ten years of probation or a twenty-five-year
208
The ability to reduce the adult sentence after
prison sentence.
201. Goodman, supra note 184, at 1092.
202. See id. (urging the Colorado legislature to adopt the “juvenile-inclusive” model).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 1092–93 (“Because blended sentencing requires juvenile offenders to
make decisions that will have a significant impact on their futures, this model forces
violent adolescents to alter their thought processes so they are capable of considering the
long-term consequences of their behavior.”).
206. Paul Tullis, Forgiven, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 6, 2013, at 28. Although either
approach to blended sentencing would be appropriate, the first approach is favorable
because it is more embracive of the restorative justice ideology. Under the first approach,
the juvenile offender has the opportunity to prove he has been restored and can live
lawfully among the larger community upon reaching the age of majority. Thus, the
primary focus of this approach is restoration and reintegration. By affording him this
opportunity earlier in life, the first approach is also cognizant of Miller’s concern for
juveniles’ diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change. Under the second
approach, however, the juvenile offender only has the opportunity for restoration and reintegration after he has lived nearly a quarter of his life in prison.
207. Id.
208. Id. Although this case involved a nineteen-year-old rather than a juvenile, it
demonstrates that restorative justice can be effectively incorporated into the traditional
criminal justice system.
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successful completion of a restorative sentence could also prove a
viable option for incorporating restorative justice into the juvenile
justice system.
An issue with adopting restorative justice legislation is deciding
whether restorative justice should constitute an entirely new system of
justice, or whether restorative justice should operate in conjunction
209
with the existing justice system. As one commentator has shrewdly
noted, “[n]o one has a magic wand to wave that will instantly
210
transform the criminal justice system into a restorative one.”
Blended sentencing addresses this concern by imposing restorative
sentences as a complement to existing sentencing practices.
Another hurdle associated with adopting restorative justice
legislation is that most restorative justice programs in the United
211
States are available only to juveniles who commit nonviolent crimes.
Critics of restorative justice argue that restorative sentences are
inappropriate for juvenile offenders who commit violent crimes
because such offenders only respond to deterrence and
212
This opinion is untenable, however, particularly
punishment.
213
because it blindly imposes judgment upon all juvenile offenders.
Even offenders who commit violent crimes can feel remorse, express
willingness to repair the harm they caused their victims, and are
214
therefore suitable candidates for restorative justice sentences.
Restorative sentences are also more demanding than traditional
215
sentences, making them a credible response to violent crime. Some
victim-offender mediation programs in the United States have already
extended their services to offenders of serious crimes such as
216
Blended sentencing
homicide, sexual assault, and armed robbery.
209. Reimund, supra note 139, at 669.
210. Id. at 672.
211. Kurki, supra note 128, at 240.
212. Walgrave, supra note 118, at 575; see also Wellikoff, supra note 142 (noting that
critics view violent crimes as “too complex and severe to allow restorative justice to play a
role in [their] outcome[s]”).
213. Walgrave, supra note 118, at 575 (responding that this “position reflects a naïve
view of the etiology of crime, as if crime seriousness expresses the offender’s social
callousness”).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., id. at 577 (arguing that while “[t]raditional procedures make the
confrontation indirect, impersonal, and filtered through ritual,” restorative sentences
force offenders to directly confront the harm they have caused and experience unpleasant
emotions such as shame, guilt, remorse, embarrassment, and humiliation).
216. Wellikoff, supra note 142. In 1996, the Center for Restorative Justice &
Peacemaking at the University of Minnesota School of Social Work performed a national
survey of victim-offender mediation programs throughout the United States. MARK S.
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is the right means to transition the country toward enacting
restorative justice legislation that includes all juvenile offenders, even
those who commit violent crimes. Implementing this model of
sentencing would pacify the concerns of critics because violent
offenders would receive both a restorative and a traditional sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court combined two strands of
precedent to hold that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
217
The decision has forced
juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.
many states to re-evaluate the way in which they hold juveniles
218
Because the Court’s decision was
accountable for their crimes.
vague, states are not confined to any one option when deciding how
219
best to reform their juvenile justice systems. This Comment argues
that all states—even those not directly affected by the Miller
decision—should earnestly consider adopting a restorative justice
220
Restorative justice is an appropriate response to juvenile
model.
criminal activity because it appropriately accommodates the needs of
juveniles during the sentencing process and ensures individualized
221
sentencing, two concerns that the Court addressed in Miller.
Furthermore, it centers the juvenile justice system on a rehabilitative
ideal, and imposes greater accountability on juvenile offenders by
222
encouraging restoration and re-integration. States could effectively
implement a restorative sentencing regime, without completely
abandoning the traditional criminal justice regime, by adopting a
blended sentencing approach: Juvenile offenders, including offenders
of violent crimes, could receive a restorative sentence in addition to a

UMBREIT ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION
PROGRAMS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
(2000),
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/reports/restorative_justice/
restorative_justice_ascii_pdf/ncj176350.pdf. The survey identified 289 programs, which
were asked whether they had previously mediated violent crimes. Id. The following results
were reported: Forty-seven programs had mediated cases of assault with bodily injury;
twenty-five programs had mediated cases of assault with a deadly weapon; fifteen programs
had mediated cases of negligent homicide; and twelve programs had mediated cases of
domestic violence. Id.
217. See supra Part I.C.
218. See supra Part II.A.
219. Id.
220. See supra Part II.B.
221. See supra Part II.C.
222. See supra Part II.C.
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traditional sentence under existing practice. 223 The Court’s decision
in Miller has given states the opportunity to legislate for restorative
justice within the juvenile justice system. States should take advantage
of this opportunity to impose sentences that hold juvenile offenders
accountable for their crimes, repair the damage caused to the victims,
and allow the community to participate in the sentencing process.

223. See supra Part II.D.

